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LOCKHART v. COMMONWEALTH EDUCATION SYSTEMS
439 S.E.2d 328 (1994)
Virginia Supreme Court
FACTS

Court ofAppeals affirmed and theVirginia Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
In the second case, Nancy L.Wright approached
Wayne B. Donelly, president of Donelly and Company, in June, 1991, concerning a possible position
with his company. She was hired as an administrative assistant by Donelly in July of 1991, and began
work on July 22 of that year. On Wright's first day
of work, Wright alleged that Donelly approached
her from behind and kissed her cheek. Wright
claimed that on the following day Donelly "physically seized her, grabbed her and hugged her without her consent.'0 Wright then informed Donelly
that she did not intend to be subjected to this treatment and that she could not work under these conditions. Donelly told Wright that they would "work
things out."4 On July 24, 1991, Donelly made "repeated abusive, inappropriate, and harassing remarks" to her and then ordered her from the establishment.5
Wright sued, alleging that her discharge was
unlawful because it violated the public policy of
Virginia as articulated in the Virginia Human Rights
Act Code 2.1-714 through 2.1-725. The trial court
sustained a demurrer filed by Donelly on the basis
that no cause of action for wrongful discharge was
recognized for gender discrimination. The Virginia
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and on
appeal the Virginia Supreme Court consolidated this
case with the Lockhart case.

In two separate cases, employees alleged they
had been fired because of their race and sex, respectively. Lawanda Lockhart, a black woman, was the
director of admissions at Commonwealth College
(Commonwealth). Lockhart alleged that she was
first demoted, then fired on account of her refusal
to participate in the discriminatory practices and polices of the institution.
Specifically, Lockhart claimed that the college
had engaged in discriminatory policies and practices
against African-Americans in admission and employment. She claimed that the president of
Commonwealth's Richmond campus (where she
worked) had attempted to force her to fire, solely
on the basis of race, black employees who failed to
meet production goals while retaining white employees who had failed to meet those same goals.
Lockhart further alleged that on at least two occasions she witnessed derogatory remarks being made
about African-Americans by high-level officials of
Commonwealth, in particular the College's registrar who made racially offensive remarks while meeting with prospective students.
Lockhart refused to participate in these policies and reported the violations to her superiors. In
response, the College officials demoted her. After
Lockhart contacted the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and a
private attorney, who in turn contacted representatives of Commonwealth, she was given an unsatisfactory performance evaluation and discharged "amid
claims her performance was inadequate even though
white co-workers, with markedly less productivity,
were retained."'
Lockhart sued in state court, and the trial court
sustained Commonwealth's demurrer on the ground
that Virginia does not recognize a cause of action
for wrongful discharge of employment. 2 The Virginia

In a six to three decision, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. Justice Hassell, writing for the majority, held that
the narrow public policy exception to the "employment-at-will" doctrine of Bowman v. State
Bank of Keysville6 should be expanded to include
discharge for race and gender.7 The Court, how-

I Lockhartv. Commonwealth Educ. Systems Corp., 439
S.E.2d 328,329 (1994).
2 Virginia Human Rights Act, 2.1-725
(1950) reads:

instituted instead of or in addition to the current statutory actions for unlawful discrimination."
3 Lockhart, 439 S.E. 2d at 329.

"Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be construed
to create, an independent or private cause of action to
enforce its provisions. Nor shall the policies or provisions
of this chapter be construed to allow tort actions to be

HOLDING

Id.
5 Id. at 330.
6 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
1 Lockhart, 439 S.E.2d at 331.
4

ever, explicitly denied reliance upon the Virginia
Human Rights Act to create a new cause of action.$
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Virginia's
commitment to the "employment-at-will" doctrine. :
This rule, however, is subject to narrow policy exceptions.
In Bowman, the defendant bank argued that
plaintiffs Bowman and Bridges were at-will employees. As such, the Bank had the right to terminate
them at any time for any reason. The Court found
an exception to the rule, holding that the retaliatory discharge of stockholder-employees who opposed the violation of security regulations by their
employers was a violation of public policy. '
In Miller v. SEVAMP," the plaintiff employee
argued that she was discharged in retaliation for the
plaintiff's appearance in a fellow employee's grievance hearing and relied upon SEVAMP's Personnel
and Administrative Procedures Manual as providing her with protection from at-will termination.
While the Court recognized an exception to the atwill employment doctrine where a discharge violates public "policy ... designed to protect property
rights, personal freedoms, health safety or welfare
of the people," 2 the Court found that the exception in Bowman did not include private rights.
Building upon Bowman and SEVAMP, the
Lockhart Court stated that the personal freedom to
pursue employment free of race or gender discrimination was of far greater importance than the freedom of a stockholder to exercise the right to vote
stock free of duress and intimidation.' ' "The Gens Id. at 331.
q Id. at 330. Virginia adheres to the common law
rule that when the intended duration of a contract for the
rendition of services cannot be determined by fair inference from the terms of the contract, then either party is
ordinarily at liberty to terminate the contract at will. Id.
"' Bowman, 331 S.E.2d at 800. Code 13.1-32, now
Code 13.1-662, confers on each shareholder one vote.
This stautory provision contemplates that the right to vote
shall be exercised free of duress and intimidation imposed
on individual stockholders by corporate management. Because the right conferred by statute is in furtherance of
an established public policy, the employer may not lawfully use the threat of discharge of an at-will employee as
a device to control the otherwise unfettered discretion of
the shareholder to vote freely his or her stock in the corporation. Id. at 801.
11362 S.E.2d 915 (1987).

eral Assembly," the Court added, "has declared this
Commonwealth's strong public policy against employment discrimination based upon race or gender." 4 The Court cited the Virginia Human Rights
Act in support of this proposition,' s but denied creating a new cause of action based upon the Act. Instead, the Court declared that it was relying "solely"
upon the narrow exception of Bowman. "
The Court rejected Commonwealth's argument
that Lockhart had no claim under the Bowman exception because there were federal remedies available to her."It is not uncommon," the Court noted,
"that injuries resulting from one set of operative facts
may give rise to several remedies, including common law tort remedies as well as federal statutory
remedies."' 7 Further, the Court denied that Lockhart
was required to exhaust administrative remedies
under Title VII before filing a state tort action."'
Justices Compton, Carrico, and Stephenson dissented, urging that under 2.1-725 of the Virginia
Human Rights Act no new causes of action may be
created."' Despite the majority's disclaimer to the
contrary, the dissent stated that the majority had
"obviously" created a cause of action to enforce provisions of the Virginia Human Rights Act. " The creation of this new cause of action resulted in an unwarranted encroachment upon the employment-atwill doctrine, "rigidly adhered to by this Court until
2
now." '
After Lockhart,an employee may sustain a cause
of action for improper discharge based upon either
racial or gender discrimination. The employee must
show that the termination was against the public
policy of Virginia, although the Court does hint that
public policy based on a federal statute could be the
basis for such an action.22 The Court has not, how"-Bowman, 331 S.E.2d 797, (1985).
" Lockhart, 439 S.E.2d at 332.
14

Id.

Human Rights Act, Code 2.1-715. (It is
the policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia: 1.To safeguard all individuals within the Commonwealth from
unlawful discrimination because of race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age, marital status or disability, in
places of public accommodation, including educational
institutions and in real estate transactions; in employment
' Virginia

'"

Lockhart, 439 S.E.2d at 331.

' Id.

I at 332.
Id.
See supra note 1.
21 Id. at 332.
"'

21

Id.

2- Id.

ever, specified what evidence at trial will provide a
plaintiff with a prima facie case since this decision
was rendered on a demurrer.
Lockhart appears to be a major departure from
the framework created in Bowman and SEVAMP. In
the previous cases, the Court acted in a conservative manner, protecting the rights of all individuals
by focusing upon some statute or public law that
protected some broad ideal and, alternatively, requiring that a public right be vindicated. In Lockhart,
however, the Court has acted without any statutory
mandate at all. As will be shown, the Court appears
to have created a common law cause of action for
wrongful discharge based upon a broad "public
policy" claim, 25 which is an uncharacteristic step for
a court as conservative as the Virginia Supreme
Court to take.
Although the Court emphasizes that the exceptions to Virginia's employment-at-will doctrine are
narrow, its focus upon "public policy" as an exception has the potential to become a major breach in
the at-will employment doctrine. The Court defines
public policy as "the policy underlying laws designed
to protect the property rights, personal freedoms,
health, safety, or welfare of the people in general."z4
In Bowman and SEVAMP, the Court tied the exception to the at-will employment doctrine to a specific statute.25 In Lockhart, however, because the
Court has defined public policy as a policy underlying a diverse group of laws, it has operationalized a
"narrow" exception in a very expansive fashion and
created a common law right of action. Presumably
then, an employee who is discharged in violation of
the policy underlying public safety laws or property
statutes would have a cause of action under this
exception. Further, laws which protect "the welfare
of the people in general" may be stretched by an
expansive court to include nearly every law in Virginia. A plaintiff could possibly utilize any law that
arguably protects "the welfare of the people in general" and survive a motion to dismiss.
The Court seems to have taken a contradictory
course in carving out exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. In SEVAMP, the Court stated,
'We. ...
think it wise to leave to the deliberate pro-

2 See Frank C. Morris, Jr., "Litigation Challenges to
Layoffs and Corporate Downsizing," American Law Institute, April 28, 1994.
24 Lockhart, 439 S.E.2d at 331 (quoting Mill v.
SEVAMP, 362 S.E.2d at 918.).
SIn Bowman the Court relied on Code 13.1-32 [now
Code 13.1-662]. Bowman, 331 S.E.2d at 800. In SEVAMP,

cesses of the General Assembly any substantial alteration of the doctrine."2 6 The Court followed its
reasoning in Bowman that required the plaintiff to
find some statute that represented the public policy
the defendant employer had violated.27 In Lockhart,
however, the Court has embraced an exception to
the at-will employment doctrine without utilizing
any statute promulgated by the General Assembly.
By doing so, the Court has created a situation in
which judges and not the Legislature will define the
contours of this "public policy" exception.
If the Court did not intend to define "public
policy" in such a broad manner, then the dissent has
correctly asserted that the majority has created a
cause of action against the express will of the Legislature-28 Although the Court attempts to place the
cause of action under the broad rubric of "public
policy," the opinion relies heavily upon the language
of the Virginia Human Rights Act in reaching its
conclusion, implicitly identifying the public policy
ideals mentioned in that statute as those relevant to
the case. The Court states that Ms. Wright pleaded
a viable cause of action despite the fact that she cited
Code 2.1-725. 29 Therefore, if the Court has intended
to limit public policy to policy established by existing law, then it has simply read out the plain language of 2.1-725 of the Act in order to carve this
exception.
If the Lockhart exception proves to be very
broad, it will create practical problems for employers. Lockhart will force employers to dearly state
their reasons for terminating employees. Although
forcing an employer to dearly articulate the reasons.
that an employee is terminated could be beneficial
in the short run, employers may fall into a pattern
of utilizing "safe" excuses so that the benefit of disclosure is forfeited in the long run.
Lockhart could also present evidentiary problems for employers. In order to be completely insulated from an attack by the employee for wrongful
discharge based upon this public policy exception,
the employer may be forced to document evidence
of its compliance with the public policies underlying the broad range of topics the Court listed. The
primary manner in which employers will achieve
the Court found that the plaintiff's failure to argue a violation of "public policy established by existing laws for
the protection of the public generally" did not fall within
the Bowman exception. SEVAMP, 362 S.E.2d at 919.
26 SEVAMP, 362 S.E.2d at 919.
2

See supra, note 24.

2' See supra, note 2.
29

See supra, note 2.

compliance will be by providing evidence of the
employee's inadequacy?0 For businesses that conduct evaluations of its employees on a regular basis,
documentation will not present any obstacle. However, for very small, businesses with no formal evaluation process, Lockhart may impose an additional
responsibility and expense. Otherwise, the business
will be open to a suit for wrongfl discharge.
The Court has not stated why it included the
long review of the fact patterns of the two cases.
On first blush it seems that the Court was furnishing practitioners with a "blueprint" of facts to allege. However, after recounting the facts in great
detail in the early portion of the opinion, the Court
makes no mention of them in reaching its decision.
The Court assumes that facts as alleged are sufficient, but does not state which facts are crucial to a
plaintiff in stating a cause of action under the exception. Instead, the Court focuses upon the Virginia Human Rights Act as proof of the Legislature's
intent and says no more. Therefore, it may be that
the Court included the facts simply because of their
egregious nature. Outrageous facts such as those in
Lockhart tend to justify and hide the expansive language of the decision, not to mention the fact that
-"This detailed documentation may actually hurt employees in the long run by damaging their chances of finding other employment by highlighting their deficiencies.

they tend to draw attention away from the fact that
the Court has created a cause of action under the
Virginia Human Rights Act, rather than to offer
plaintiffs a "blueprint."
CONCLUSION
Practitioners will want to watch the Court's future opinions on this issue closely. Although the
court probably saw the creation of a common law
right of action for wrongful discharge as being in
the best interests of the Commonwealth, a court as
traditionally conservative as the Virginia Supreme
Court may rethink some of the broad language found
in the Lockhart opinion. Moreover, at this time, the
Court has done nothing more than to allow the case
to survive a motion to dismiss. The Court has not
specified how the case will be presented at trial or
what facts are critical to a plaintiff's success. The
Court may limit the scope of the public policy exception to so-called "suspect classes" such as gender,
race, religion or national origin. The Court may also
refine its holding in Lockhart to require that plaintiff cite a particular statute in pleading a viable cause
of action. As the Court has defined "public policy"
at this time, though, the exception has the potential to become extremely broad.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Morgan W. Alley

